Fairly recently, a new encryption scheme for audio data encryption has been proposed in [Naskar, P.K., et al. Multimed Tools Appl (2019) 78: 25019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11042 -019-7696-z]. The cryptosystem is based on substitution-permutation encryption structure using DNA encoding at the substitution stage, in which the key generation is based on a key chaining algorithm that generates new key block for every plain block using a logistic chaotic map. After some several statistical tests done by the authors of the scheme, they claimed that their cryptosystem is robust and can resist conventional cryptanalysis attacks. Negatively, in this paper we show the opposite: the scheme is extremely weak against chosen ciphertext and plaintext attacks thus only two chosen plaintexts of 32 byte size are sufficient to recover the equivalent key used for encryption. The cryptosystem's shuffling process design is vulnerable which allow us recovering the unknown original plaintext by applying repeated encryptions. Our study proves that the scheme is extremely weak and should not be used for any information security or cryptographic concern. Lessons learned from this cryptanalytic paper are then outlined in order to be considered in further designs and proposals.
Introduction
Due to some intrinsic characteristics of multimedia data (videos, audios…) [1] , including bulk data size, strong correlation between uncompressed neighbor data-units, high presence in real-time systems and the necessity for fast processing and transmission [2] [3] . Multimedia data processing and transmission has become a challenging area of research in order to convoy modern applications requirements [4] . Information security and data privacy constitutes a crucial requirement in modern network applications and data transmission. Public networks are threatened by several cyber-attacks due to the high and random accessibility to computer networks. Multimedia data security as any data type security is one of the most important process to handle before establishing any information transfer over public networks. The necessity for fast multimedia processing applications that responds to real-time requirements makes multimedia application development a hot topic in recent research arena [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] .
Cryptography and cryptographic protocols [10] make one basic layer for any data type security, cryptography is the art of designing highly secure systems that aims to convert original data from a readable state to an unrecognizable form except for entities that own the secret key. Conventional cryptosystems has been shown in some related works to be insufficient to respond to all mentioned requirements [11] . That's why designing new cryptosystems with high security and fast processing time has become a primordial issue since the beginning of our current century [12] [13] [14] [15] . Two of the most relevant requirements in modern cryptography are confusion and diffusion depicted by C. Shannon in his paper "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems" in 1949 [16] . Confusion refers to making the relationship between the key and the ciphertext as complex as possible while diffusion refers to the property that the redundancy in the statistics of the plaintext is dissipated in the statistics of the ciphertext. It has been observed that chaos theory exhibits similar proprieties as confusion and diffusion in cryptology theory [17] .
Chaos theory is a branch of mathematics studying the strange behaviors of dynamic systems and chaotic attractors that has two main characteristics [17] : the sensitivity to initial conditions (small changes in initial conditions leads to significantly great changes in the orbit of the strange attractor), and ergodicity. Chaos theory has been widely used in designing new cryptosystems [5] [6] [7] [8] [13] [14] [15] . Nevertheless, the security level claimed by authors of each proposal is still in doubt until carrying out a sound cryptanalytic study on their design [20] . Some of them have been already cryptanalyzed in subsequent works [18] [19] . As a result, many recommendations and guidelines have been proposed to assess some basic level of security in new works [17, 21] .
From multimedia to big data, the need for huge and complex calculation capacity and storage space pushes researchers to look up for other computing capabilities [22] and environments that meet all requirements for computing-world tendency and modern applications. DNA computing is a rising filed of new computing generation which makes use of biochemical reactions techniques to perform computations across a medium of biological DNA molecules [23] . DNA computing has three main advantages over traditional silicon computing, which are inherited basically from some intrinsic characters of DNA molecules: a high degree of parallelism, low energy consumption and a vast amount of information storage [24] .
In [25] a new proposed cryptosystem dedicated especially for audio data security is designed based on DNA encoding and the logistic chaotic map. The new proposed system is a block cipher that operates on blocks of 32 byte size. It is based on a key chaining algorithm that generates different new key block for any plain block. The scheme's design is based on two main operations: substitution using a DNA XOR (exclusive-or) operation, followed by a shuffling process to permute bytes within each block. The experimental and statistical tests done by the authors of the scheme shows good performances [25] . However, in this paper we scrutinized the new proposed system and we found that the scheme has some critical flaws. Exploiting those vulnerabilities allows us to conduct many cryptanalytic attacks on the overall system as we will demonstrate in further sections.
The organization of this paper is as follow: the second section describes the audio data cryptosystem under study. Section 3 outlines some vulnerabilities and security flaws found in the scheme, two main vulnerabilities are considered as critical flaws and make the system weak under many cryptanalytic attacks. In section 4 we illustrate our proposed chosen plaintext attack as well as a small discussion about chosen ciphertext attack. In section 5 we illustrate our so called cycle attack which is a customized version of chosen plaintext attack that aims to recover the plaintext without doing any programming effort and only by exploiting the cryptosystem's encryption machinery. In section 6 we depict some lessons learned from this cryptanalytical paper to avoid designing systems with same vulnerabilities in further proposals. Finally, the section 7 discusses our results and concludes the paper.
Description of the audio data encryption scheme
The scheme under study [25] is labeled in this paper as DECS-AU scheme (DNA Encoding and Chanel Shuffling Audio Encryption scheme). It is based on the logistic chaotic map [26] and DNA encoding to handle different operations of the process of encryption as well as decryption. The DECS-AU is a block cipher that operates on blocks of 32 byte length. In this section we re-describe briefly all the process of the encryption operation as detailed in [25] followed by a tiny description of the decryption process. DECS-AU could be described in three basic steps, which are: key scheduling and chaining, substitution operation and shuffling operation.
1) Key scheduling and chaining:
Each single plain block 2 of 32 byte size is encrypted with a corresponding key derived basically from the previous key block using the logistic chaotic map Eq. (2). The original 32 byte key (the one chosen by the user) is denoted as (master key) and used to generate the first key block for the encryption of the first plain block . As mentioned in [25] , consecutive blocks use definitely distinct keys. The key is generated using the previous generated key as follow:
Where ( ) is the byte of the key , ( ) function denotes reduction modulo 256, the floor function ⌊ ⌋ calculates the greatest integer less than or equal ( ), we define ( ) as: ( ) ( ) , and we define as , finally is defined using the logistic map equation as :
Where is calculated by the following equation:
That is, the initial condition is calculated first from the master key , and then the logistic map with a fixed parameter is iterated according to the position of the key byte.
The last operation in key scheduling process is to update the generated values according to the following updating operation:
This updating operation ensures that two successive key blocks are byte-wise distinct one from another. This key chaining ensures a good diffusion of the master key along all the key-blocks.
2) Substitution operation:
Substitution operation aims to confuse the plaintext 3 using the key generated at the key scheduling stage. Here, the same process for one block is done for every block of the plaintext . The substitution operation could be described in three steps: 1) DNA encoding operation:
Each byte from the block denoted as ( ) (the byte of the plain block ) is encoded into its DNA sequence according to a well-defined rule calculated as:
The encoding map used in [25] is depicted in Table 1 . The same process is done to encode the entire key to its corresponding DNA nucleotide sequence. The same rule is used to encode the same byte from both and . We denote the encoding function that encodes a single byte according to the rule as:
( ) * + (6) Table 1 DNA encoding and decoding map according to the rule type used in [25] Rule A  T  G  C  00  11  10  01  00  11  01  10  11  00  10  01  11  00  01  10  10  01  00  11  10  01  11  00  01  10  00  11  01  10  11  00 2) DNA XOR operation: After the encoding of bytes using DNA encoding rules, DNA XOR operation is carried out between block's DNA codes and key's DNA codes. In [25] the definition of DNA XOR operation is based on the binary XOR operation (bitwise EX-OR operation): for any given rule the DNA code for a DNA XOR operation is defined as the DNA encoded bitwise XOR operation of the two operands in binary form. Table 2 depicted the DNA XOR operation according to the rule . Table 2 DNA XOR operation according to rule 1 [25] DNA XOR
3) DNA decoding operation: After the calculation of the DNA XOR operation between key entities and block entities, the results are decoded back to the binary form according to the same rule used for encoding of each byte. The decoding function according to the rule decodes a quadruplet of nucleotides back to a single binary byte and it is denoted as:
The overall substitution process could be formed mathematically as:
Where ( ) is the byte of the substituted block, and are previously defined in Eqs. (6) and (7) and denotes DNA XOR operation.
3) Shuffling operation:
The last operation in the encryption process is the shuffling of bytes within each substituted block . The shuffling algorithm calculates shuffling indexes, which is a permutation map for each substituted block and it depends on the corresponding key block. Odd indexes are stored in one array called right channel * ( ) + and even indexes are stored in another array called left channel * ( ) + . And every byte ( ( )) is swapped with its corresponding byte ( ( )). The algorithm used to generate the two left and right channels is depicted in Fig. 1 . The shuffling operation is mathematically equivalent to: ( ) ( ) (9) Where ( ) is the byte of the cipher block, and is defined as ( ) (10) Where is a bijective function from the set to such that * + where denotes the concatenation of the the set and the set . is defined as:
According to Kirchhoff's principle [27] , the underlying algorithm and all design of a cryptographic system should be known to public and the secrecy of the system must rely only on the secret key. The overall encryption process could be formulated mathematically as:
Where ( ) is the byte of the cipher block, and is defined in Eq. (10).
The decryption process is done by taking encryption steps in reverse order. Firstly, using the same key chaining process to de-shuffle the cipher block, and then de-mask it according to the same substitution operation. 
Security flaws in DECS-AU scheme
In this section we outline some critical observed vulnerabilities in the DECS-AU scheme. Some vulnerabilities affect directly the overall system's security, while others are considered as weaknesses of design and bad implementation of some ideas and operations, therefore, they could be exploited to enhance some attacks or partially reveal some secret parts of data or keys. Our observed security flaws are described as follow: 1) Bad confusion/diffusion [16] resulting from the fact that in key chaining operation only the previous key is considered, neither the plain blocks nor the cipher blocks are related to the key generation and chaining process. This is a crucial vulnerability in the system, knowing only the first key block will immediately allow us to recover any desired key block by application of the known algorithm of the key scheduling and chaining operation as described in the previous section. This vulnerability opens the door to many cryptanalytic attacks (e.g. chosen plaintext attack (Section 4.1), chosen ciphertext attack (Section 4.2), differential attack (section 4.1), known plaintext attack …). Proposition 1: Since the key blocks in DECS-AU are related only to the previous key block, then knowing the first key block is sufficient to recovering all the keys used for the encryption of any plaintext using the same master key . According to this proposition, we will focus in our attacks to recover only the first key block. 2) No security effect is added by DNA encoding: DNA computing is a rising field of computing where the medium of operations is biological DNA molecules which adds more benefits to the world of computing (due to some intrinsic molecule's characteristics) such that high degree of parallelism, low energy consumption and vast storage space [24] . In last years, several proposals has been published to implement some computing capabilities using DNA strands such that making logic gates [28, 29] and implementing arithmetic operations [30, 31] . However in the DECS-AU scheme, the methodology adopted to encode binary data and perform DNA XOR operation is by definition based on binary XOR operation. Thus, DNA operations are no more than just and encoding/decoding operations. The definition of the DNA XOR operation as explicitly depicted in [25] could be equivalently formulated for any given rule as:
Where and are two bytes. From this last equation we can say that the DNA XOR operation as done in [25] is equivalent to a simple bitwise EX-OR operation in the binary form (denoted as ). That is, this operation may benefits only from some DNA computing pros including parallelism, vast storage space … And no security effect is envisaged to be added by this mean.
3) Period-2 shuffling map (shuffling an element two times regains its original position): the shuffling operation is a permutation process that shuffles bytes inside each substituted block . Generally, the total number of possible permutations for a block of 32 distinct bytes is permutations, and the range of a permutation, which is the smallest integer that if the permutation is applied times the data will regain its initial form (no permutation occurred) should be as large as possible and close to . The algorithm (shown in Fig. 1 ) used by authors of the DECS-AU to generate permutation maps is very weak and all permutations generated by the algorithm are of range . This critical vulnerability makes all the permutation maps (that could be considered as permutation keys) a weak keys, and makes the overall system weak against cycle attack (to be detailed more in Section 5). Proposition 2: the range of all permutation maps (shuffling) in [25] is That is, for any ( ( )) . In other words, for any block , the application of only shuffling process twice has no effect on the block . Proof: Let two elements , such that ( ) , we have to prove that ( ( )) : From Eq. (11) we have: Thus, we have proved that for any given : ( ( )) (16) This proves the proposition.
4) Fixed parameter of the chaotic logistic chaotic map: the parameter of the chaotic logistic
map is by definition in the range ,of real numbers. However, the logistic map exhibits chaotic behavior only when the parameter belongs to some distinct regions within ,but not all the range. The determination of these chaotic regions needs deep analyzing of the bifurcation diagram to exclude all non-chaotic periodic windows. Nevertheless, in [25] only one fixed parameter is used in every call for the chaotic map, which may allow one to deduce the value of the initial condition from any value of the chaotic map and the order of iterations .
5)
No padding method is defined for the DECS-AU scheme to adjust the last block to a 32 byte block: if the padding of blocks is based on zero padding (use null bytes to pad), then information about the last key block will be clearly manifested (in shuffled form) in the last cipher block. 6) The applicability of the DNA XOR operation as defined in [25] is seriously questionable (The XOR DNA is dependent on the rule at each operation). DNA XOR gates such as in [29] are based on oligonucleotides strands, thus every binary state (0 or 1) is encoded using an oligonucleotide strand, which allows making some DNA logic gates. The feasibility of the DNA XOR operation as defined in [25] should be at least simulated.
Differential chosen plaintext attack and chosen ciphertext attack 4.1 Differential chosen plaintext attack
Chosen plaintext attack is an attack in which the attacker gains temporary access to the encryption machinery. Thus, he could choose some intentionally made plaintexts and get their corresponding ciphertext under some unknown key. The objective of the attack is to recover the key or the equivalent key used for encryption. From (Proposition 1), if we recovered the first key block , all subsequent keys could be recovered. In this attack, we will demonstrate that only two chosen plaintexts of 32 byte size are sufficient to recover the first key block and thus recovering the full equivalent key used in the encryption process.
In this section we denote the first plaintext as and the second plaintext as both are blocks of 32 bytes. Their corresponding substituted blocks are denoted as and respectively. And their corresponding ciphertexts are denoted as and respectively. Fig. 2 illustrates a flowchart of our proposed differential chosen plaintext attack. Our proposed attack could be described in two main steps:
1) Recovering the shuffle map of the first block:
In order to recover the shuffle map of the first block, we have to satisfy two conditions: i) Make unique identifier for each byte position in the plaintext block ii) Cancel out the substitution process, thus .
By this mean, we will observe the new position of each byte in the ciphertext which will allow us to deduce the shuffling map. In order to achieve that, we will combine a differential attack with a chosen plaintext one to cancel out the substitution effect.
Fig. 2 General schema of our proposed differential chosen plaintext attack
The substitution process is based on the DNA XOR operations, and from Eq. (13) we have that DNA XOR operation is equivalent to binary bit-wise XOR operation. Let us consider the difference between the two ciphertext blocks as:
From Eq. (12) we have for :
Where is defined in Eq. (10).
Thus, using Eq. (13) we have:
Thus, we could write the difference in ciphertext blocks in function of the difference in plaintext blocks as:
In other words, we do cancel out the substitution effect and only shuffling effect remains. By this mean, we have satisfied the second condition mentioned in the beginning of this subsection and we could easily deduce the permutation map if we choose carefully the two plaintexts and to satisfy the first condition in such a way to have unique identifier value for each byte in ( ) plain block. One possible proposition is to make the plain blocks difference as: ( )( ) (21) The two chosen plaintexts could be chosen as:
The shuffling map for the first block could be recovered according to Eq. (10) as: * + * ( )( )+ * ( )( )+ (23) 2) Recovering the key block :
After the recovery of the shuffling map, the recovery of the key is quite simple operation. From Eqs. (12) , (13) and (22) we have:
is a shuffled version of the key block . According to (Proposition 2), we simply apply the shuffling map (recovered from the previous step) once on the ciphertext to recover the key block . Generally according to (Proposition 2) we have:
3) Recovering all key chains:
After the recovery of the first key block , and according to (Proposition 1), we use the algorithm described in the key scheduling and chaining algorithm from the (Section 2) to recover as many key blocks as needed to decrypt any other plaintext encrypted under the same master key . Fig. 3 demonstrates our proposed differential chosen plaintext attack: the time-domain plots of the two chosen plaintexts and are shown respectively in Fig. 3 (a) and (b) and their corresponding ciphertexts time-domain plots are shown respectively in Fig. 3 (c) and (d) . The frequency-domain plot of the supposed unknown plaintext (a sine wave of frequency ) is shown in Fig. 3 (e) and its corresponding ciphertext's frequency-domain plot is shown in Fig. 3 (f) . All the samples are encrypted under the same master-key:
Note that all keys used in this paper are generated randomly using rand function from octave 4 , and that all samples are mono-channel samples that are sampled under a sampling frequency of using 8-bits per sample. The recovered key is used to decrypt the ciphertext which its frequency-domain plot is shown in Fig. 3 (f) and the time-domain (portion of it) as well as the frequency-domain plots of the recovered plaintext are shown respectively in Fig. 3 (g) and (h). The recovered plaintext matches the original one. 
Chosen ciphertext attack
For a chosen ciphertext attack, only one chosen ciphertext of 32 bytes size is required to directly recover the first key block . The flowchart of our proposed chosen ciphertext attack is illustrated in Fig. 4 . The chosen cipher block is * ( ) + , thus shuffling process decryption will not affect the cipher block since all bytes are with the same value, thus, the substituted block is itself the cipher block: .
Then, according to Eqs. (12) and (13) we have:
Where is the corresponding plaintext of the ciphertext , Thus:
That is, the key block is manifested directly in the decrypted plaintext . 
Weak keys and cycle attack
Weak keys are keys that lead to some undesired results (e.g. no or bad encryption, self-decryption…). That is, if for example encrypting some plaintext with the same key twice leads to recovering the original plaintext, then the key is considered as a weak key. We extend this definition to our proposed cycle attack to consider a relatively small number of successive encryptions .
Our proposed cycle attack is based on repeating encryptions of a particular unknown plaintext times under the same unknown key , Fig. 5 shows the general flowchart of our proposed cycle attack. It could be seen as a chosen plaintext attack with chosen plaintext. The cycle attack could success (e.g. be feasible) only under weak keys, that's why for any cryptographic system it is better worth to exclude all weak keys from the key space. . Thus, for any key, if the encryption process is applied twice, the shuffling permutation will be canceled.
Lemma 1: for any even number
, applying successive DECS-AU encryptions on the same plaintext will cancel out the shuffling process effect.
Proof: trivially proved using (Proposition 2), by applying ⁄ double encryptions.
From Eq. (13), the substitution process is based on XOR operation. Bit-wise XOR operation is characterized by the fact that for any byte we have the following propriety: . Thus, in order to cancel out the effect of XOR operation we have to apply it twice.
Proposition 3:
Under any master key , the DECS-AU scheme is weak under our described cycle attack. And only application of successive encryptions is sufficient to recover the unknown original plaintext.
Proof:
Let be a plain block and is its corresponding cipher block under some key , ( ) is the byte of , we have to prove that after 4 encryptions we have: ( ) ( ) where is the cipher block after -encryptions.
We have according to Eqs. (12) , (13) and (25):
That is, we have proved that wich implies that after 4 encryptions under the DECS-AU scheme we will recover the original plain.
To experimentally demonstrate this proposed attack, we consider an unknown plaintext 5 where both time-domain and frequency-domain plots are shown in Fig. 6 Fig. 6 (i) and (j) shows the time-domain and frequency-domain plots respectively of the 4-th encryption operation. As shown, the 4-th encryption returns back to the original plaintext, which demonstrates experimentally our described attack. The master key used for these encryptions is: Fig. 6 Demonstration of our proposed cycle attack: (a,c,e,g,i) time-domain plots of the original plaintext, its first encryption cipher, its second one, its third one and its fourth one respectively (b,d,f,h,j) their corresponding frequency-domain plots respectively
Lessons learned and recommendations for further works
In this section to follow, we outline some lessons learned from this cryptanalytic paper as well as some recommendations to be considered in improving the DECS-AU system or in designing another similar one. However, the DECS-AU system is considered at this stage to be faulty and with no security level, thus we recommend omitting it and don't use this system for any security concern. Some recommendations for designing similar systems are outlined below: 1) Make strong confusion/diffusion between key block and plain block chains, thus, it is recommended to use some cryptographic modes (e.g. CBC, CFB, OFB …) in order to diffuse plain blocks along with both cipher blocks and key blocks. Fig. 7 shows a diagram of CBC block chaining mode in which each ciphertext block depends on all previous plaintext blocks (IV is an initialization vector used to encrypt the first block) . 2) Use some existing DNA computing operations, we encourage the use of conventional DNA XOR operation as in [29, 30] . 3) Change the shuffling method and use more robust permutation maps. We propose for example to generate entirely key dependent permutation maps using other chaotic maps or any other methods to generate permutation maps. In addition to that, we recommend the use of both intra-block and inter-block permutations. That is, permuting bytes within a block and also from block to another one according to some permutation maps. 4) Use other chaotic maps since logistic map is not recommended for cryptographic use as shown in [32] . 
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the security of a new audio data cryptosystem proposed in [25] based on key chaining and DNA encoding. The key chaining algorithm aims to generate a new key block for every plain block. This process, as claimed by authors of the scheme in [25] , allows enhancing the security of the system. Nevertheless, we found that this process has two drawbacks: the main and the first one is depicted in (Section 3, vulnerability (1)) as this process don't take in consideration neither the plain block nor the cipher block to generates new key blocks, which leads to a bad confusion/diffusion implementation. The second one is that repeating the overall process of the key generation for every single plain block is time consuming. Some other vulnerabilities found in the scheme are detailed in (Section 3) including the period-two of the shuffling map which contributes in major part, to the deficiency of the system.
In addition to that, we have mounted three particular attacks (i.e. differential chosen plaintext attack, chosen ciphertext attack and cycle attack) to evaluate the system's security and its robustness. Negatively, we have found that the system is not as secure as claimed in [25] . The chosen ciphertext attack is the simplest one since it has lowest time complexity but it requires temporary access to the decryption machinery under the targeted key. The two other attacks are both considered as a chosen plaintext attack but they differ in some aspects. The first attack named differential chosen plaintext attack is actually based on two combined attacks: differential attack and chosen plaintext attack. The minimum number of required chosen plaintexts for this proposed attack is two chosen plaintexts. The second one called cycle attack is a type of chosen plaintext attack but it do not require any intervention from the part of the attacker such that programming new pieces of code, making some customized sets of plaintexts or do calculations… all the attacker needs is the temporary access to the encryption machinery and the ciphertext to be broken. That is, by re-encrypting any given ciphertext three successive encryptions we end up by recovering the original unknown plaintext. If needed, the key could be recovered (fully or partially) by applying a known-plaintext attack.
Our attacks' demonstrations are shown visually based on time-domain plot, frequency-domain plot or both of them. We have chosen to depict the most convenient plot type for every result to shed light upon the main differences between results and to be as representative as possible, for example for sine waves it is better worth to use frequency-domain plots to visualize the information data.
Our results show the weakness of the system under study and that it is not recommended for cryptographic use and information security. In addition to that, we have detailed our observed vulnerabilities and we have addressed some recommendations deduced from this cryptanalytic paper to avoid such vulnerabilities in further works.
